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THE  REVENUE AND  EXPENDITURE  CONTROL ACT of 1968 was the key mea- 
sure  responsible  for a large  fiscal  swing  toward  restraint  from  a full  employ- 
ment  deficit  of roughly  $10  billion  in the first  half of 1968  to a full employ- 
ment surplus  of about  the same size in the first  half of 1969.1  That fiscal 
restraint  was intended  to halt the boom and thereby  to curb  inflation.  As 
everyone  knows,  it did not stop inflation-nor has any of the host of other 
economic  policy actions  undertaken  in the United States  since 1967.  The 
linkage  between  halting  a boom  and  curbing  inflation  has  turned  out to be a 
much more difficult  and less reliable  process  than the profession  judged 
three  years  ago. 
An even  more serious  criticism  of the 1968  act is that it did not halt the 
boom as promptly  or decisively  as had been predicted  by its proponents. 
Actual output exceeded  estimated  potential  for a year after the tax sur- 
charge  and  the  expenditure  hold-downs  were  instituted.  Yet the  record  does 
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show a marked  deceleration  in the pace of economic  activity  starting  in 
mid-1968.  Whereas  real  GNP had grown  at a 61/2  percent  annual  rate  dur- 
ing the first  two quarters  of 1968,  it decelerated  progressively  to a rate of 
31/2  percent  in the latter  two quarters  of 1968  and 21/2  percent  in the first 
two quarters  of 1969. 
Thus the fiscal  restraint  program  failed  to achieve  its objective  with re- 
spect  to prices  and  did not even  fully  realize  the desired  prompt  slowdown 
of aggregate  activity.  In this sense,  the surcharge  period  offers  a dramatic 
contrast  to the experience  that  followed  the tax cut of 1964,  when  economic 
activity  accelerated  markedly,  just as the proponents  had promised.  Dis- 
cussing  that earlier  experience  in a paper  completed  in September  1965,  I 
began  with  the statement,  "The  best known  fact about  the Revenue  Act of 
1964  is that,  in the year  and  a half  since  it took effect,  economic  activity  has 
expanded  briskly."2  Basically,  I am obliged  to begin  the current  discussion 
of the Revenue  Act of 1968  by pointing  out that  the best-known  fact about 
it is that inflation  has continued  unchecked  since  its enactment. 
The second sentence  of my paper  on the 1964 tax cut, however,  said: 
"But such  post hoc,  propter  hoc reasoning  will never  do." That statement 
remains  true in 1971. The fact that the fiscal restraint  program  of 1968 
didn't  do all it was supposed  to do doesn't  prove  it did nothing.  To what 
extent  was it responsible  for the significant  deceleration  in activity  that  fol- 
lowed it? To what extent did it curb demand  ceteris  paribus,  only to be 
swamped  by a strengthening  of private  demand  that would have occurred 
quite  independently  of the fiscal  restraint?  To what extent  did it have re- 
straining  effects  that  were  offset  by a shift  toward  ease  in monetary  policy? 
These  questions  deserve  answers.3  In this  paper  I will  focus  on only a sin- 
gle aspect  of these questions  by reviewing  one element  of the program  of 
fiscal  restraint-the 10  percent  surcharge  on personal  income  taxes.  To esti- 
mate the extent  to which consumption  was directly  curbed  by the added 
personal  income  taxes,  I shall  first  describe  the nature  of the change  in the 
tax law; next discuss  some  theoretical  positions  that might  generate  differ- 
ent expectations  about the probable  effectiveness  of the surcharge;  and 
finally  examine  the empirical  evidence  on consumer  demand  in 1968-70,  as 
2. Arthur  M. Okun, "Measuring  the Impact of the 1964 Tax Reduction,"  in Walter 
W. Heller (ed.), Perspectives  on Economic  Growthi  (Random House, 1968),  p. 28. 
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interpreted  by the consumption  equations  of four  well-known  econometric 
models. 
The Nature  of the Surcharge 
The Revenue  and  Expenditure  Control  Act of 1968  was signed  into law 
by the President  on June  28. Its enactment  was the culmination  of a bitter 
legislative  battle that lasted for more than ten months after President 
Johnson proposed a 10 percent  surcharge  on corporate  and individual 
income  taxes on August  3, 1967. 
The act provided  for a surcharge  of 10 percent  on federal  corporate  in- 
come  taxes,  retroactive  to January  1, 1968.  As it was  subsequently  extended, 
the corporate  surcharge  continued  at the 10 percent  rate  through  calendar 
year 1969; it then dropped  to a 5 percent  rate for the first  half of 1970, 
statutorily  translated  into a 21/2  percent  rate on profits  for calendar  year 
1970. 
The limitations  on federal  budget  outlays  contained  in the act called  for 
expenditures  to be reduced  by $6 billion  below levels set forth  in the Jan- 
uary  1968  budget  document  for fiscal  year 1969,  but the act exempted  out- 
lays  on Vietnam,  interest  on the public  debt,  veterans'  benefits  and  services, 
and social  security  benefits. 
The personal  tax surcharge,  which  is the focus  of this  paper,  was enacted 
at a 10 percent  rate,  retroactive  to April  1, 1968  and  continuing  to June  30, 
1969.  At an annual  rate,  it added  about  $8 billion  to aggregate  liabilities  for 
personal  income  taxes. The law exempted  low-income  taxpayers,  such as 
families  of four with incomes  of less than $5,000;  but this relief  provision 
amounted  to only $300  million  per  year  in the aggregate.  For a typical  fam- 
ily of four  with a $10,000  annual  income,  the surcharge  added  $111  to tax 
liabilities  on a full-year  basis; at a $25,000  income,  it was worth  $441. 
Specifically,  the 1968  law provided  for a 71/2  percent  increase  in the lia- 
bilities  of covered  taxpayers  for the calendar  year  1968  (reflecting  a 10 per- 
cent surcharge  for three-quarters  of the year),  and  5 percent  for 1969  (a 10 
percent  surcharge  for half the year).  The withholding  rate of personal  in- 
come taxes  was raised  on July 15, 1968,  to take account  of the surcharge. 
Because  of its retroactive  feature,  the surcharge  provision  reduced  refunds 
and increased  final  tax payments  on 1968  liabilities  in the spring  of 1969. 
Subsequently,'in  1969,  the surcharge  was extended  at a 10 percent  rate  for 
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of calendar  1970.  It expired  in effect  on June 30, 1970, although  the law 
provided  for a 21/2  percent  increase  in liabilities  for the 1970  calendar  year. 
The payment  of federal  income  taxes  is recorded  in the national  income 
accounts  at the time the taxpayer  actually  parts  with cash, either  through 
withholding  or through  payment  of estimated  or final  installments.  From 
the liability  rates  and  the withholding  rates  that prevailed  before  and after 
the enactment  of the surcharge,  the incremental  federal  personal  income 
taxes  attributable  to the surcharge  (for  given  before-tax  incomes)  can  be es- 
timated  in a fairly straightforward  manner.  The resulting  estimates,  re- 
corded  in Table 1, were  provided  by Charles  Waite  of the Department  of 
Commerce.4  The series  begins  in 1968:3  and then  takes  a temporary  jump 
in the first  half of 1969,  reflecting  the retroactive  feature;  it steps  down at 
the beginning  of 1970  when  the surcharge  rate fell to 5 percent;  and it fi- 
nally  drops  to a negligible  figure  after  mid-1970. 
The Link  to Consumption 
The question  of how the consumer  responded  to the income tax sur- 
charge  merely  asks to what extent  the resulting  cutback  in disposable  in- 
come  held  down  consumption  outlays  and  to what  extent  it held  down  per- 
sonal  saving.  An arithmetic  identity  ensures  that  any  change  in income  must 
be allocated  between  a change  in consumption  and  a change  in saving.5  Ac- 
cording  to the historical  record  of aggregate  quarterly  data on household 
income and its disposition,  most changes  in disposable  income are pri- 
marily  reflected  in altered  consumption,  at least after  a lag of a few quar- 
ters.  On the margin  as well as on the average,  the largest  portion  of dispos- 
able  income  is consumed.  The record  provides  evidence  on how much  and 
how fast a typical  change  in disposable  income  is translated  into a change 
in consumption.  The  same  historical  record,  however,  warns  us that  dispos- 
able  income  is not the only  determinant  of consumption  outlays.  Such  vari- 
ables as stocks of consumer  goods, wealth,  liquid assets, and credit  con- 
4. The estimates  are expressed  in terms of seasonally  adjusted  annual  rates. Seasonal 
adjustment  of the nonwithheld  portion is not a straightforward  matter, unfortunately. 
5. It seems safe to ignore the possibility  that the tax increase  led to a quantitatively 
significant  change in the remaining  minor component of disposable  income, personal 
transfer  payments;  these consist of payments  of interest  on personal  debt to businesses, 
and gifts to pergons  overseas.  Personal  transfers  amounted  to 2.6 percent  of disposable 
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Table 1. Impact of Tax Surcharge  on Federal Personal 
Income Tax Payments, 1968-70 
Billions of dollars, seasonally  adjusted  annual  rates 
Year  Current  dollars  1958 dollars" 
and 
quarter  Withheld Nonwithheld  Total  Total 
1968:3  5.3  0.8  6.1  5.1 
4  6.3  0.8  7.1  5.9 
1969:1  6.5  4.2  10.7  8.8 
2  6.7  4.2  10.9  8.9 
3  6.9  0.2  7.1  5.7 
4  7.1  0.2  7.3  5.8 
1970:1  3.6  1.4  5.0  3.9 
2  3.6  1.4  5.0  3.9 
3  0.0  0.4  0.4  0.3 
Source: Tabulation by Charles Waite, U.S.  Department of Commerce, Office of Business Economics, 
December 23, 1970. 
a.  Deflated by implicit deflator for personal consumption expenditures. 
ditions have been found (by at least some investigators)  to  influence 
consumption  significantly.  And even with all the determining  factors  that 
can be quantified,  economists  cannot  explain  perfectly  the allocation  of in- 
come  between  consumption  and  saving.  The  behavior  of the  consumer  does 
not precisely  follow  statistical  predictions  and at times  departs  widely  from 
such  relationships. 
Ever  since  economists  have  become  interested  in fiscal  policy,  they have 
operated  generally  on the fundamental  premise  that  changes  in after-tax  in- 
come  resulting  from  a change  in personal  tax rates  are  basically  equivalent 
in their  influence  on consumption  to changes  in income  arising  from  other 
sources.  In fact,  there  is not much  direct  empirical  evidence  to validate  (or 
refute)  this fundamental  premise.  Following  the big tax cut in 1964,  con- 
sumer  outlays  corresponded  very  well  with  the assumption  that  the tax cut 
would  affect  consumer  spending  about  as much  and  as rapidly  as any  other 
addition  of equal  size  to spendable  income.  But  most of the support  for the 
fundamental  premise  is analytical.  So long as a tax increase  has no special 
effects  on consumer  expectations,  asset  values,  or income  distribution,  and 
so long as it does not result  in additional  public  services  that were  previ- 
ously  purchased  in the private  market,  a tax increase  of one dollar  "ought" 
to offset  a before-tax  income  gain  of one  dollar.  In a sense,  the  premise  is an 
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tionally  with respect  to their  budget  constraints.  After-tax  income  sets the 
constraint  on the sum  of consumption  and  saving;  it is the income  available 
for allocation  by the household.  If, by coincidence,  a family  were  to experi- 
ence  a sudden  but sustained  rise  in income  before  taxes  at the same  time  and 
by the same  amount  that  tax rates  were  increased,  the household  would  be 
neither  better  off nor  worse  off; there  would  be no clear  reason  to expect  it 
to raise  or lower  its standard  of living  (or thus  to alter  its rate  of saving).  A 
family's  spending  is not expected  to depend  significantly  upon  whether  it is 
paid in check  or in cash, or whether  payday  is Friday  or Monday;  by the 
same  reasoning,  its consumption  is not expected  to depend  merely  on the 
way its disposable  income  is made up of before-tax  income and subtrac- 
tions for income  taxes. 
RESERVATIONS  AND  QUALIFICATIONS 
Although  the fundamental  premise  is intuitively  appealing,  it is merely 
suggestive,  rather  than conclusive.  A tax change  could have special  effects 
on expectations  and on other subjective  determinants  of consumption.  In 
any particular  episode,  it is easy  to offer  reasons  that might  make  the con- 
sumer  respond  differently  and uniquely.  In the case of the surcharge,  sev- 
eral such reasons  have been suggested.  The most important  of these hy- 
potheses  is related  to the permanent  income  view of consumer  demand;  it 
will  be explored  in detail  below.  But  first,  several  other  hypotheses  deserve  a 
brief  analytical  review. 
The  triviality  argwnent.  Many  laymen  seem  puzzled  that  economists  ever 
expect  a significant  effect  on consumer  expenditures  from  a change  in after- 
tax income  that amounts  to only a dollar  or two a week  for middle-income 
families.  Why,  they ask, should  that change  anybody's  standard  of living? 
It seems  too trivial  to matter. 
Such arguments  have never  carried  much  weight  within  the profession, 
however.  Although  the economist  can  imagine  income  changes  that  may  be 
too trivial  to matter,  he can't decide  whether  they would  be too trivial  to 
affect  consumption  or too trivial  to affect  saving,  and  they  have  to affect  at 
least one of the two. The rhetorical  question  can be turned  on its head: 
Why should  a small  change  in income  affect  people's  decisions  on the de- 
sirable  rate of increasing  their  wealth?  The implication  of that question  is 
that any small increment  (or decrement)  in income  will be matched  by a 
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Moreover,  discontinuities  at the household  level  could  still be consistent 
with  continuity  in the  behavior  of aggregates.  Even  if every  family  were  pre- 
pared  to hold  its consumption  constant  unless  and  until  its income  changed 
enough to cross some threshold,  some families  would be close to their 
threshold  at any one time  and  could  be pushed  into a substantial  change  of 
consumption  by a tiny  change  in income.  Perhaps  it is merely  a professional 
bias, but the economic  analyst  relies  on continuity  of aggregate  responses 
to all sorts of small  changes  in the economy,  and rarely  does he find em- 
pirical  evidence  that  contradicts  this assumption. 
The  ratchet  argument.  Nearly  a generation  ago, James  Duesenberry  and 
Franco  Modigliani  provided  good analytical  and empirical  evidence  of an 
asymmetrical  response  of consumption  to increases  and decreases  in in- 
come. Generally,  consumption  declines  less when  income  falls  below  a pre- 
vious  peak  than  it rises  in response  to an equal  increase  in income  to a new 
peak.6  There is a ratchet  effect and a resistance  to belt-tightening  when 
income  declines. 
But the ratchet  argument  seems  to have little relevance  to the tax sur- 
charge  experience.  Of course,  most American  workers  experienced  a slight 
dip, of roughly  1 percent,  in their  take-home  pay at the moment  the sur- 
charge  withholding  rates took effect. But, for most families,  changes  in 
before-tax  income  must have swamped  this effect  within a short interval. 
From 1968:2  to 1968:3,  per  capita  disposable  income  actually  rose in real 
as well as nominal  terms.  The ratchet  argument  would  have  important  im- 
plications  for aggregate  consumption  only if an extraordinary  fraction  of 
American  families  experienced  income declines  or remained  below their 
previous  peak  incomes  for a sustained  period.  And there  is no evidence  to 
suggest  that such  was the case. 
The variability  of income  for individual  households  is enormous.  As an 
earlier  study  showed,  seven-eighths  of all families  reported  that some  event 
between  January  1964  and May 1965  had changed  their  income  by 10 per- 
cent or more. Two-thirds  reported  that some event had decreased  their 
income by such an amount during  this period, although  most of these 
families  also experienced  events  resulting  in even larger  income  increases. 
6. James S. Duesenberry,  Income, Saving, and the Theory of  Consumer  Behavior 
(Harvard  University  Press, 1949);  and Franco  Modigliani, "Fluctuations  in the Saving- 
Income Ratio: A Problem  in Economic  Forecasting,"  in Studies  in Income  and Wealth, 
Vol. 11, Conference  on Research  in Income  and Wealth  (National Bureau  of Economic 
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Only about half of all families  had incomes  in 1964  that were within 10 
percent  of their  1963  incomes.7  As these  data  suggest,  only an infinitesimal 
fraction  of families  have exactly  the same before-tax  incomes  two years 
in a row. It is hard to believe  that a significant  fraction  of total income 
belonged  to the group  of families  that was pushed  from no change  (or a 
minuscule  rise)  in income  into the minus  zone as a result  of the surcharge. 
The ratchet  argument  applies  to absolute  declines  in (real or money)  in- 
come, and  the surcharge  itself  was rarely  responsible  for absolute  declines. 
Interaction with inflation  and inflationary  expectations. Since the impact 
of recent  or expected  price  increases  on consumer  demand  is uncharted,  it 
attracts  conjecture  and speculation.  If consumption  seems  unusually  weak 
while prices are rising strongly  (as in 1968:2 or 1970:3), one tends to 
suspect  that the consumer  is resisting  inflation  or adjusting  to a reduction 
in the real value of his liquid assets.  On the other  hand, when consumer 
demand  seems  particularly  strong  in an inflationary  period  (like 1966:1), 
one wonders  whether  inflationary  expectations  are  encouraging  consumers 
to buy now in order  to beat subsequent  price  increases.  And indeed  both 
conjectures  may conceivably  be right. 
Putting  the tax surcharge  into the picture  permits  endless  variations,  in 
either  direction,  on the causal  arguments.  To sample  one  line of conjecture: 
When  people  feel squeezed  by inflation,  they want  to rationalize  actions  to 
maintain  consumption  and trim saving.  The tax surcharge  gave them an 
excuse  for saving  less, and  they grabbed  it, especially  since  they were  fairly 
liquid and found it easy to borrow.  Another conjecture  invokes a self- 
denying  prophecy:  People  felt uncertain  because  of the inflation,  and  they 
thought  the government  was stopping  inflation  when  the tax surcharge  was 
passed;  therefore  they might  have spent  more of their income and stimu- 
lated  the inflation. 
Advance  perception of the tax increase. The long legislative debate over 
the tax surcharge  gave the consumer  an opportunity  to anticipate  its im- 
pact.  He may accordingly  have  reduced  consumption  before  the enactment 
of the surcharge,  particularly  on durable goods involving installment 
charges.  Indeed,  in advance,  many  people  seemed  to overestimate  the im- 
pact of the tax surcharge  on their  incomes,  even  interpreting  it as an added 
liability  amounting  to 10 percent  of their  income  rather  than 10 percent  of 
7. George  Katona and Eva Mueller,  Consumer  Response  to Income  Increases  (Brook- 
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their taxes. Thus, the anticipation might have been worse than the realiza- 
tion. 
Such highly subjective, ad hoc conjectures defy systematic verification, 
but they cannot be dismissed. 
The Permanent  Income  Hypothesis 
Among all the conceivable reasons that the surcharge could have had a 
significantly different  impact from other cutbacks in the growth of disposa- 
ble income, the most serious and most challenging is the permanent income 
hypothesis-the  proposition that consumption is altered much less in re- 
sponse to changes in income that are viewed as transitory than in response 
to those viewed as permanent. As stated strongly by Robert Eisner: 
The basic economic error of those who saw in the 10 percent income tax 
surcharge  an adequate  measure  against  inflation  may be charged  to failure to 
take into account the implications  of the permanent  income hypothesis  .... 
Dealing in terms of equilibrium  or permanent  income, an increase  in tax with- 
drawals  of some ten or eleven  billion  dollars  per year  may be expected  to have a 
very substantial  depressant  effect  on aggregate  demand....  But the tax increase 
legislated in  the surcharge  did not represent a  corresponding  reduction in 
permanent  after-tax  income.8 
PERMANENT  INCOME  AND  TEMPORARY  TAX  CHANGES 
The analysis of a temporary tax change in light of the permanent income 
hypothesis raises a number of important theoretical and empirical issues. 
Among the assumptions and implications of the permanent income hy- 
pothesis, the one that makes it relevant to the tax surcharge  is the view that 
households gear their standards of living, not to  measured income in a 
single calendar quarter or year, but to their longer-run income expectations 
or "permanent income." When a family experiences a change in current 
income that it expects to be sustained through time, the response of con- 
sumption is full and reasonably prompt. However, when the change in cur- 
8. Robert Eisner, "Fiscal and Monetary  Policy Reconsidered,"  American  Economic 
Review,  Vol. 59 (December  1969), p. 898. Eisner  also argues  that investment  could not 
have been curbed  to any significant  degree  by the temporary  corporate  surcharge,  and I 
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rent  income  is viewed  as transitory  and does not alter  expected  future  in- 
come,  the household  tends  to spread  the transitory  or windfall  component 
over  a long horizon,  allowing  only a small  portion  to alter  consumption  in 
the current  year.9 
In its loosest  qualitative  terms,  the hypothesis  has overwhelming  appeal. 
Anybody  who does any saving  reveals  that his relevant  time horizon  for 
planning  is longer  than the current  period.  Unless wealth  accumulation  is 
his primary  and ultimate  goal, he must be concerned  about fitting  con- 
sumption  to his needs  over  a longer  time horizon.  If a family  gets substan- 
tial income receipts that it views as windfalls,  the impact on current 
consumption  is bound  to be smaller  than would be the case from an equal 
addition  to income  that is expected  to be recurrent  and permanent.  The 
controversial  issue is how much difference  this makes: What types of 
income  items  do consumers  identify  as purely  transitory  and under  what 
circumstances?  What is the length of the horizon  they focus on in their 
consumption  decisions? 
Even  between  the principal  pioneers  of the permanent  income  view,  the 
judgments  are far apart: Friedman  uses a three-year  horizon, assessing 
the marginal  propensity  to consume  out of windfalls  at roughly  one-third, 
while Modigliani-Brumberg  take a lifetime  horizon,  implying  an annual 
impact  as small  as 0.04.  These  authors  agree,  however,  in limiting  the scope 
of the permanent  income hypothesis  to consumer  expenditures  on non- 
durables  and services.  They distinguish  between  the purchase  of durable 
goods  and  the enjoyment  of a flow of services  from  durables;  both analyses 
view  the acquisition  of additional  durable  goods as one of the many  ways 
in which  transitory  income  may be added  to wealth. 
EMPIRICAL  TESTS 
The response  of consumers  to windfalls  can be investigated  directly  only 
through  the few surveys  of household  budgets  in which  sources  of income 
have been identified  in sufficient  detail  that presumptive  windfalls  can be 
isolated.  Several  tests have  been performed  by Ronald  Bodkin and others 
9. Milton Friedman, A Theory  of the Consumption  Function  (Princeton  University 
Press  for the National Bureau  of Economic  Research,  1957);  and Franco  Modigliani  and 
Richard  Brumberg,  "Utility  Analysis  and the Consumption  Function:  An Interpretation 
of  Cross-Sectiohi  Data," in Kenneth K.  Kurihara (ed.), Post Keynesian  Economics 
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on a 1950  U.S. survey  that isolated  windfall  income consisting  largely  of 
National Service  Life  Insurance  dividends.  Both in his initial  report  and  in 
subsequent  investigations,  Bodkin  found  no evidence  that  the  marginal  pro- 
pensity  to consume  was  less  from  windfall  income  than from  other  income. 
Indeed, Bodkin ran into the problem  that his data tended to prove too 
much: The marginal propensities  to  consume from windfall income 
generally  exceeded  those from regular  income. This curious result lent 
some  plausibility  to Friedman's  conjecture  that the amount  of the life in- 
surance  dividend  might have been indirectly  related to  the permanent 
income  of the household.10 
Another  group of studies  investigated  Israeli  data in which the prime 
source  of windfall  income  was restitution  payments  to German  refugees. 
There  the authors  found a resounding  difference  between  spending  pro- 
pensities,  just as would be implied  by the permanent  income  hypothesis. 
According  to Mordechai  Kreinin,  the marginal  propensity  to consume  out 
of windfalls  was about  one-fourth  that out of other  income,  as revealed  in 
the Israeli  data.11 
A persuasive  reconciliation  of the Bodkin  and Kreinin  findings  was pre- 
sented  by Michael  Lansberger.12  The windfalls  in the Kreinin  study  were 
large,  of roughly  the same  order  of magnitude  as the regular  income  of the 
recipients.  In contrast,  the windfalls  in the 1950  U.S. data averaged  about 
7 percent  of the total income  of recipients.  Lansberger  showed  further  that 
the  marginal  propensity  to consume  out of windfalls  was,  in the  Israeli  data, 
very strongly  negatively  related  to the size of the windfall  in relation  to 
other  income.  This  pattern  suggested  that  households  segregate  large  wind- 
falls  from  regular  income  and  treat  them  specially  as capital  account  items, 
but that families  typically  lump small  windfalls  with regular  income.  The 
10. Ronald Bodkin, "Windfall  Income and Consumption,"  American  Economic  Re- 
view,  Vol. 49 (September  1959),  pp. 602-14; Margaret  G. Reid, "Consumption,  Savings 
and Windfall Gains," American  Economic Review, Vol.  52 (September 1962), pp. 
728-37; Roger C. Bird and Ronald G. Bodkin, "The National Service Life-Insurance 
Dividend of 1950 and Consumption:  A Further  Test of the 'Strict'  Permanent-Income 
Hypothesis,"  Journal  of Political Economy,  Vol. 73 (October 1965), pp. 499-515; and 
Milton Friedman,  "Comments,"  in Irwin Friend and Robert Jones (eds.), Proceedings 
of the Conference  on Consumption  and Saving  (University  of Pennsylvania  Press, 1960), 
Vol. 2, pp. 197-98. 
11. Mordechai E. Kreinin, "Windfall  Income and Consumption-Additional Evi- 
dence,"  American  Economic  Review,  Vol. 51 (June 1961),  pp. 388-90. 
12. Michael Lansberger,  "Windfall  Income and Consumption:  Comment,"  Ameri- 
can Economic  Review,  Vol. 56 (June 1966),  pp. 534-40. 178  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1971 
same  results  were  suggested  by a survey  of Colorado  families  analyzed  by 
Conrad  Doenges.13 
Indeed,  no empirical  study  suggests  that a negative  windfall  as small as 
the surcharge's  dent of 1 percent  of disposable  income  would be treated 
any differently  from a permanent  reduction  in income  of the same  size. In 
short,  the windfall  view of the surcharge  gets no support  from the direct 
empirical  tests. 
That view is also subject  to other  reservations.  First, influenced  in part 
by the history  of the Korean  war "temporary"  taxation,  American  citizens 
typically  were skeptical  that the tax surcharge  would actually  expire  in a 
short  time. Secondly,  the very  nature  of the wartime  inflationary  economy 
of  1966-68 must have created enormous  uncertainties  about long-run 
prospects  for both before-tax  and after-tax  real  incomes.  Some  workers  in 
defense  plants  must  have  doubted  the viability  of long-term  careers  in their 
Vietnam-related  jobs. Other  manufacturing  workers  who had unusual  op- 
portunities  to work overtime  must  have  questioned  whether  the phenome- 
non was temporary  or the hallmark  of a new age of perennial  full (or over- 
full) employment.  Married  women must have asked the same questions 
about the ready availability  of jobs for them. The new experience  with 
inflation  after almost a decade of abeyance  must have raised  important 
questions  about  the longer-run  horizon  among  both people  who were  hurt 
by price  increases  and  those  who reaped  gains.  In that  environment,  a great 
many elements  may have created  a gap between  current  income  and per- 
manent  income,  as perceived  by consumers.  Any and  all of these  could  have 
influenced  consumer  demand.  So could anything  that altered  the degree  of 
confidence  people felt about the long run, given the precautionary  char- 
acter  of some saving.  The surcharge  may have  been one of the special  fac- 
tors, but it hardly  seems  reasonable  to believe  that it was a key element  in 
the transitory  components  of household  incomes. 
Just  as a matter  of autobiographical  fact,  I wondered  and  guessed  about 
these issues  in 1967-68; as I reported  in 1969: "Viewing  the surcharge  in 
advance,  I felt that some discount  on its restraining  effect  should  be taken 
for its temporary  character.  There  was no certainty  about  the right  size of 
the discount,  but 20 or 25 percent  seemed  to be in the ballpark."'4 
13. R. Conrad  Doenges, "Transitory  Income Size and Savings,"  Southern  Economic 
Journal,  Vol. 33 (October  1966),  pp. 258-63. 
14. Arthur M. Okun, The Political Economy of Prosperity  (Brookings Institution, 
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The Tax Reform  Act of 1969  raises  another  issue about  the interpreta- 
tion of temporary  and permanent  income  tax rates.  That act provides  for 
a cut in personal  taxes  of $9.5  billion  a year,  with  the reductions  scheduled 
to take effect  in stages  lasting  until  January  1973.  Thus,  Congress  adopted 
lower  permanent  tax rates  but essentially  enacted  a temporary  measure  de- 
laying  their  effective  date.  On a logical  interpretation  of Modigliani-Brum- 
berg  and  (to a somewhat  lesser  degree)  Friedman,  the reduction  in perma- 
nent tax rates  should  have  been a major  determinant  of consumer  outlays 
in 1970 and should  have generated  an unusually  high rate of consump- 
tion in relation  to current  income.  Recent consumption-income  patterns 
do not confirm  this  view,  nor has any  permanent  income  exponent  followed 
the logic of his theory  to argue  this case. Of course,  many  consumers  may 
not even  be aware  of these  forthcoming  changes  in the tax base and rates; 
but that in itself is relevant  to the issue.  To take the long horizon  view of 
consumer  budgeting  seriously,  one must believe  that families  are careful 
forecasters  of their  own  financial  future  and  energetic  collectors  of relevant 
information.  A man who does not read news reports  on such matters  as 
changes  in tax rates  and in social security  benefits  is simply  not a Modi- 
gliani-Brumberg  man. 
The Nature  of the Experiment 
Any theoretical  position that dismisses  or strongly  discounts  the con- 
sumption  impact  of the tax surcharge  would  point to higher  levels  of con- 
sumer spending  during  the surcharge  period than those implied  by the 
alternative  view that the surcharge  was effective  in curbing  consumption. 
According  to the windfall  view of the surcharge,  the expected  differences 
would be concentrated  in outlays for nondurable  goods and services. 
These  differences  permit  empirical  tests of the alternative  views. 
Statistical  relationships  that use officially  measured  disposable  personal 
income  as the income  variable  in explaining  consumption  implicitly  count 
on the surcharge  to be as effective  as any other  cutback  in spendable  in- 
come, with no discount  necessary  to allow  for the transitory  income  effect 
or for any other  reason.  This may be called  thefull-effect  view of the sur- 
charge.  Of course,  the standard  equations  allow  for lags in the response  of 
consumption  to income;  any income  change  results  at first  in a relatively 
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over time. If, during  the surcharge  period,  consumption  equations  based 
on the full-effect  view  predicted  consumer  outlays  with  errors  that  were  not 
unusually  large  and  that averaged  close to zero, the full-effect  view  would 
be confirmed. 
The full-effect  view may be contrasted  with a zero-effect view that the 
surcharge  had no influence  on consumption  (that is, its total impact  was 
on saving).  According  to the zero-effect  view, the relevant  concept  of in- 
come for predicting  consumer  expenditures  during  the surcharge  period 
should be disposable  personal  income (as officially  measured)  plus  the 
amount  of extra  personal  taxes imposed  by the surcharge.  If predictions 
of consumption  during  the surcharge  period  based  on this adjusted  income 
concept  yielded  satisfactory  results  with errors  symmetrically  distributed 
around  zero, the zero-effect  view would  be confirmed.'5 
A  SCHEMATIC PRESENTATION 
These alternative  hypotheses  are shown schematically  in Figure 1. The 
level of officially  measured  disposable  income  for any quarter  in the sur- 
charge  period,  consistent  with  the full-effect  view, is designated  by Y. The 
adjusted  income  concept  based  on the zero-effect  view  is Y',  which  is higher 
than Y by S, the dollar  amount  of the surcharge.  Now assume  that there 
is an agreed  set of "best"  statistical  relationships  for estimating  consumer 
demand,  given the relevant  concept of income. There will then be two 
alternative  estimates  of consumption,  designated  E and E', based on the 
two income  concepts,  Y and Y',  respectively.  Of course,  because  it assumes 
a higher  value of relevant  income,  E' exceeds  E. The distance  between  E 
and E' is the expected  direct  impact  (M) of the surcharge  on consumer 
spending,  as interpreted  by the full-effect  view. 
Now suppose  that the actual  value of consumption  for a given  quarter 
is observed,  and  that it turns  out to be A2 in the diagram.  Then  the predic- 
tion error  based on the full-effect  view is (A2 -  E);  in accord  with the 
convention  that the error is measured  as actual value minus predicted 
value, the underprediction  yields a positive error designated  as U. The 
prediction  error  based on the zero-effect  view is (A2-  E'), in this case a 
negative number designated as V. In general, M  =  U -  V. 
15. Neither  the transitory-income  view of the surcharge  nor any of the other  skeptical 
views cited above necessarily  implies that the surcharge  would have no effect whatso- 
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Figure  1. Schematic  Diagram  of Full-Effect  and  Zero-Effect  Views 
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The basic  empirical  test to discriminate  between  the full-effect  and  zero- 
effect hypotheses  consists of comparing  the size (in absolute  terms, in- 
dependent  of sign)  of the typical  U and  typical  V. If A2  (between  E and  E') 
were  the typical  observation  throughout  the surcharge  period,  the results 
would  point to a partial  effect  of the surcharge:  U would be positive  (re- 
flecting  underprediction  by the full-effect  view) and V would be negative 
(reflecting  overprediction  by the zero-effect  view).  In particular,  if, as pre- 
dicted, A2 is somewhat  closer to E' than to E, U is larger  in absolute 
size than V, revealing  the full-effect  view as less accurate  than the zero- 
effect  view. In that event,  however,  an hypothesis  of less than half of the 
full effect  would  be more  accurate  than either  the zero- or full-effect  view. 
If the typical  consumption  observation  was A1  (greater  than  E'), U would 
be larger  (absolutely)  than V and the zero-effect  view would  be the more 
accurate  by far. However,  in that case, with actual consumption  higher 
than the estimate  based on the zero-effect  view, it would have to be in- 
ferred  that some other stimulative  factor was operative,  even with the 
surcharge  having zero effect. Similarly,  if actual consumption  ran con- 
sistently  below E, as illustrated  by A3, then the full-effect  view would be 
superior,  but something  besides  the tax surcharge  must  have  been  working 
to hold consumption  down. 
Such an interpretation  begins essentially  with the hypothesis  that the 
only forces  consistently  and significantly  pushing  consumption  upward  or 
downward  during  the surcharge  period  were  the variables  specified  in the 
consumption  equations  and the surcharge.  If actual  consumption  outlays 
remain,  on average,  between  E and E', this hypothesis  is maintained.  If, 
however,  they lie outside  that range,  it becomes  necessary  to discard  the 
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To the extent  that the surcharge  had any direct  impact  on consumption, 
it also would  have  had subsequent  multiplier  effects  curbing  the growth  of 
before-tax  income  and accelerator  effects  dampening  business  investment. 
It might  also  have  led  to a change  in monetary  policy.  None of these  second- 
round  or subsequent  effects  is reflected  in M. That  measure  of direct  impact 
simply  records  the first-round  impact  based on the full-effect  view, when 
all other  relevant  variables  are known, including  the components  of per- 
sonal income, the relevant  monetary  and credit  factors,  the level of em- 
ployment,  and so on. 
THE  NEED  FOR  DYNAMIC  SIMULATION 
Since the empirical  test focuses on the direct  impact of the surcharge 
and  not on multiplier  effects,  it is perfectly  satisfactory  to review  consumer 
behavior  during  the surcharge  period using actual values of disposable 
income  (as interpreted  by either  the zero-  or full-effect  view),  prices,  money 
variables,  and unemployment.  A serious  problem  arises,  however,  because 
many of the consumption  equations  include  as explanatory  variables  the 
past value of the consumption  component  that is being predicted.  The 
proposition  that expenditures  for gasoline  (for example)  this quarter  de- 
pend, in part, on previous  expenditures  for gasoline  obviously  does not 
imply a causal relationship.  Rather, lagged expenditure  is designed  to 
reflect  habit formation  and persistence  of consumer  tastes through  time. 
But the lagged  terms  also are useful  for predictive  purposes  because  they 
correct  recent  errors  in the causal  explanation  of that component  of con- 
sumption  and  because  they  may  capture  autocorrelated  measurement  errors 
in the data.  Basically,  in attributing  substantial  weight  to past  expenditures, 
the computer  is telling  the investigator:  When  consumption  is higher  than 
expected  in one quarter,  history  teaches  us that it is also likely  to be some- 
what higher  than would otherwise  be expected  in the next quarter. 
The  lagged  expenditure  term  thus  permits  predictions  based  on an incor- 
rect theoretical  view of consumption  to be mechanically  corrected  and to 
approach  the predictions  based  on the valid  analytical  view.  It may  become 
impossible  to tell who is right  and who is wrong  if errors  are  mechanically 
corrected  quarter  after quarter.  If the full-effect  view of the surcharge  is 
all wrong,  the investigator  may observe  at the start  of the surcharge  period 
that consumption  is higher  than  he anticipated;  if he then  uses  these  higher 
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up the distinction  between  the zero-effect  and  full-effect  views.  Static  simu- 
lation,  the formal  term  for this quarter-by-quarter  technique,  will thus  not 
produce  efficient  discrimination.  As a result, one must turn to another 
technique  known as dynamic  simulation.  In this experiment,  the investi- 
gator  is asked  to "forecast"  consumption  for the surcharge  period,  know- 
ing all the relevant  determining  variables  except the actual  values  of con- 
sumption during  that period. Whenever  his statistical  relationships  say 
that current  consumption  depends  in part on previous  consumption,  the 
investigator  must  rely on the values  of previous  consumption  that he him- 
self predicted. 
The choice of the technique  of dynamic  simulation  requires  the further 
choice of a starting  point. When should the experimenter  be required  to 
stop looking at the consumption  data?  There  is good reason  to blindfold 
him well before  the surcharge  period  begins  because  the influence  of the 
state of demand  in the last known  quarter  diminishes  over  time; this prac- 
tice makes the results during  the surcharge  period less sensitive  to the 
particular  conditions  of demand  in the last known quarter.16  I selected 
1967:2 as the last known quarter  before  seeing any of the simulations.  I 
liked it because  it was the quarter  immediately  preceding  the surcharge 
proposal,  because  consumer  expenditure  was  not behaving  very  abnormally 
in relation  to income  at that  time, and  because  a head  start  of five  quarters 
prior  to the surcharge  period  is enough  to dilute  much of the influence  of 
the jump-off  point. 
Thus,  the experiment  consists  of "predicting"  consumer  spending  during 
the surcharge  period  of 1968:3  to 1970:3  on the two extreme  assumptions 
of full effect and zero effect.  The ex post predictions  are made with full 
information  on actual economic activity prior to mid-1967  and on all 
relevant  matters  after  mid-1967  except actual  values  of consumer  expendi- 
tures. 
THE  MODELS 
The consumption  equations of four well-known  econometric  models 
were  applied  to this experiment:  Data Resources,  Inc. (DRI); Michigan's 
16. The persistence  of the effect depends  on the coefficient  of the lagged expenditure 
term. It decays exponentially  through time at a rate depending  on its distance from 
unity. A coefficient  of 0.5 gets down to 0.06 of the initial  error  in four quarters,  while one 
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DHL-III;  Office  of Business  Economics  (OBE);  and Wharton.17  The con- 
sumption  components  in DRI are  expressed  in current  dollars  while  those 
in the other three  models are expressed  in 1958 dollars;  for purposes  of 
comparison,  all errors  and  predictions  of each  equation  of the DRI model 
have  been converted  into 1958  dollars  in the tables  and discussion  below. 
The sample  periods  for the statistical  estimates  also differed  among  the 
models: They were 1954:1 to  1970:2 for DRI;  1954:3 to  1967:4 for 
Michigan;  1953:2  to 1968:4  for OBE;  and 1953:3  to 1970:1  for Wharton. 
Ideally, the equations  employed  for this experiment  should have used 
sample  periods  terminating  before  the onset of the surcharge  in 1968:3. 
Since the official  disposable  income series  used in the equations  reflects 
the full-effect  view of the surcharge,  the inclusion  of quarters  after  1968:2 
might  tend to pull the estimated  coefficients  in the direction  of that view. 
Only the Michigan  model meets  the criterion  of purity;  the OBE  sample 
period  is nearly  pure.  Wharton  and  DRI, on the other  hand,  include  most 
of the surcharge  period  in their samples.  Still, the surcharge  period  rep- 
resented  only about  one-eighth  of the total sample  period,  and  none of the 
results  below  casts suspicion  on this particular  feature  of the test. 
The models vary in their degree  of disaggregation  of consumption  ex- 
penditures,  with three  equations  for Michigan;  four  for Wharton;  five  for 
OBE; and eleven  for DRI. (A detailed  listing of these equations  is avail- 
able on request  from  the author.)  Nondurable  goods and services  outlays 
combined  are  explained  in a single  equation  by the Michigan  model.  That 
relationship  has three  explanatory  variables:  the level of spending  on non- 
durables  and  services  in the preceding  quarter  (with  a coefficient  of 0.945), 
disposable  income in the current  quarter,  and disposable  income in the 
preceding  quarter. 
At the other  extreme  of disaggregation  is the  DRI model,  which  identifies 
17. The most recent  published  descriptions  of these models  are Data Resources,  Inc., 
The Data Resouirces  Econometric  Forecasting  System: A Preliminary  Account (DRI, 
November 1970); Saul H. Hymans and Harold T. Shapiro, "The DHL-III Quarterly 
Econometric Model of  the U.S.  Economy," in The Outlook  for  1970, Seventeenth 
Annual Conference  on the Economic Outlook at the University  of Michigan,  Novem- 
ber 20-21, 1969 (1970); Maurice Liebenberg,  Albert A. Hirsch, and Joel Popkin, "A 
Quarterly  Econometric  Model of the United States: A Progress Report," Survey of 
Current  Business,  Vol. 46 (May 1966), pp. 13-39; Michael K. Evans and Lawrence  R. 
Klein, programmed  by George  R. Schink,  The Wharton  Econometric  Forecasting  Model 
(University  of Pennsylvania,  1967). The OBE and Wharton  models have been revised 
extensively,  and new publications  on both are forthcoming.  In addition, some or all of 
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and explains  eight  separate  components  of nondurables  and  services.  Each 
of these equations  relies on disposable  income  for the current  quarter  as 
the single  income  variable.  Most of the equations  contain  a relative  price 
variable,  and some also include  population  or a time trend. In addition, 
each  includes  a weighted  average  rate of consumption  of the item in ques- 
tion over  the preceding  four quarters,  whose  predetermined  weights  range 
downward,  counting from the preceding  quarter,  from 0.4 to 0.1. The 
coefficients  on this lagged  spending  term are roughly  0.5 for most of the 
nondurable  goods categories,  but for gasoline  and oil and for the services 
they run  between  0.78 and  0.92. Coefficients  of this magnitude  ruled  out a 
meaningful  static  simulation. 
The OBE  approach  employs  a single  equation  for nondurables  and two 
for services.  The nondurables  equation  includes  average  expenditures  on 
nondurables  for the preceding  four quarters  as one explanatory  variable. 
It also has the special  feature  of distinguishing  transfer  payments  from 
other  components  of disposable  income;  the estimated  impact  of transfer 
payments  on consumption  of nondurables  is about  one and one-half  times 
as large  as that of other  disposable  income,  presumably  reflecting  the ten- 
dencies  of transfer  recipients,  such  as social  insurance  pensioners,  to devote 
more of their incomes  to nondurables  and less to autos and saving.  The 
two service  components,  housing  and other services,  are explained  on a 
per capita basis, both with a term to correct  for last period's  error.  The 
housing  equation  is unique  in having  no direct  income  variable;  instead  it 
uses  the sum  of expenditures  on nondurables  and services  in the preceding 
tour quarters,  presumably  as an indicator  of how much is available  for 
expenditure  on housing. 
The Wharton  model devotes one equation  each to nondurables  and 
services:  Current  disposable  income  appears  in both equations,  as does  the 
expenditure  in question  with a one-quarter  lag. The coefficients  on the two 
lagged  expenditure  terms  differ  widely:  0.98 for services  and  0.37 for non- 
durables.  In addition,  the nondurables  equation  has a relative  price  term. 
A noteworthy  "non-Keynesian"  feature  of these two Wharton  equations 
is a money-stock  term, which attributes  to recent increases  in broadly 
defined  money  (currency,  demand  deposits,  and  time deposits)  a modestly 
stimulative  influence  on consumer  outlays  for nondurables  and services. 
Consumer  expenditures  on durable  goods, excluding  autos and parts, 
are explained  in a single  equation  by three of the models.  Michigan  uses 
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mediately  preceding  quarter,  and expenditures  on nonauto  durables  in the 
preceding  quarter.  The 0.87 coefficient  on the lagged expenditure  term 
shows  strong  persistence  of demand  patterns.'8  The OBE  model accounts 
for nonauto  durables  with two explanatory  variables:  disposable  income 
of the current  quarter,  and a liquid  asset  measure.  In the Wharton  model, 
the explanatory  variables  are disposable  income  of the current  quarter,  a 
relative  price measure,  the growth  of the broadly  defined  money supply 
over  the last four  quarters,  the unemployment  rate  and its change  over  the 
past four quarters,  and residential  construction  activity. 
In the DRI model, consumer  expenditures  on nonauto durables  are 
divided  into two categories  with furniture  and appliances  separated  from 
all other  items.  Disposable  income  and  the unemployment  rate  of the cur- 
rent quarter  are explanatory  variables  in both equations.  In addition,  the 
demand  for furniture  is taken to be positively  related  to recent housing 
starts  and negatively  related  to current  expenditures  on automobiles  and 
parts.'9 
Each of the models has an equation  explaining  consumer  demand  for 
automobiles.  All include  a "dummy"  to allow for strike  effects.  In addi- 
tion, DRI uses the following  variables:  current  disposable  income  net of 
transfer  payments,  unemployment,  the stock  market,  and  an  income  change 
variable.  In the Michigan  model the explanatory  variables  are disposable 
income  lagged  one and  two quarters;  the unemployment  rate  for males  of 
age  twenty  and  over,  lagged  one and  two quarters;  a relative  price  variable; 
and  lagged  expenditures  on automobiles  of the preceding  quarter.  In OBE, 
the variables  are disposable  income net of transfers,  the manufacturing 
work  week,  the stock of automobiles,  relative  prices,  and a correction  for 
the prediction  error  of the preceding  quarter.  Wharton's  equation  includes 
current  disposable  income net of transfers,  a relative  price variable,  the 
unemployment  rate, a consumer  credit  dummy,  and a variable  reflecting 
the interest  rate structure.  Both OBE and Wharton  explain automobiles 
and parts net of expenditures  on mobile homes, although  the latter are 
included  in the auto component  of the official  statistics. 
18. This is the mirror  image of a relatively  slow quarterly  rate of adjustment  (0.13 = 
1 -  0.87) to the discrepancy  between  actual  and equilibrium  stocks of nonauto  durables. 
See the discussion of this point in Hymans and Shapiro, "The DHL-III Quarterly 
Econometric  Model." 
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The Empirical  Findings 
In discussing  the results,  I will follow  the least common  denominator  of 
disaggregation  among the models and thus divide the discussion  into 
(1) nondurable  goods and services, (2) nonautomobile  durables, and 
(3) automobiles. 
NONDURABLES  AND  SERVICES 
Despite  the differences  in the explanatory  variables  of the statistical  re- 
lationships  and in the degree  of disaggregation,  the four models  yield re- 
markably  similar  estimates  of the direct impact that the tax surcharge 
should have had on consumer  spending  for nondurables  and services  on 
the assumption  of full effectiveness.  They  imply  that  the first-round  impact 
of the surcharge  should  have  curbed  consumer  expenditures  on nondurables 
and services  by between  $1.2  billion  and $1.6 billion  at annual  rates  in the 
second  half of 1968 and by between  $2.5 billion and $2.6 billion in 1969 
(see the impact  column  in Table 2). The impact  estimates  fan out a little 
in 1970,  reflecting  the varying  importance  attributed  to longer-lagged  ef- 
fects; the largest  estimated  impact  during  the first  three quarters  is $2.3 
billion  (annual  rate)  for DRI and  the smallest  is $1.6 billion  for Wharton. 
(All dollar  figures  throughout  are in 1958  prices.) 
The lags in the models allow for a considerable  buildup  period  before 
changes  in income  have a nearly  proportional  effect on outlays  for non- 
durables  and services.  In the first half-year  of the surcharge,  only about 
one-fourth  of the $5.5 billion  rate of the surcharge  is expected  to show  up 
as a decline  in outlays  for nondurables  and services.  Even  during  1969,  the 
expected  impact  is approximately  35 percent  of the $7.3  billion  withdrawal 
from income accounted  for by the surcharge.  On the average,  however, 
nondurable  goods and services  account  for about three-fourths  of total 
disposable  income.  If a change  in income  were  sustained  for an indefinite 
period,  the ultimate  impact  on nondurables  and  services  would  be roughly 
three-fourths  in both the Michigan  and Wharton  models.  In the case of 
OBE,  it would  be about a half, whereas  in the DRI model, it approaches 
0.9. Thus, standard  econometric  models reflect  the evidence  that sudden 
changes in income-whether permanent  or temporary-have gradually ,'-~L.  O  O  I  O  j^ir  '-4  Om  -  4  c 
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increasing  effects  on consumption.  The estimated  impacts  for 1970,  which 
linger  on after  the surcharge  expires,  also reflect  the diffusion  of the effects 
over  time. 
The errors  on nondurable  goods and  services  in the experimental  predic- 
tions are  clearcut  (see Table  2). For every  single  quarter  in all four  models, 
the zero-effect  view of the surcharge  overpredicts  expenditure  on these 
items.  However,  in three  of the models  (DRI is the exception),  the  full-effect 
view  also  overpredicts  the  level  of expenditures  on nondurables  and  services 
in every  single quarter,  although  these errors  are substantially  smaller  in 
absolute  size.  In the case of DRI, the full-effect  view  tends  to underpredict 
a little-on  the average,  $0.6 billion  in contrast  with the $1.6 billion aver- 
age overprediction  of the zero-effect  view. By a more refined  statistic  de- 
scribed  in the appendix  and shown  in Table  3, the DRI verdict  is that the 
tax surcharge  was  69 percent  as effective  as a standard  change  in disposable 
income  in curbing  consumer  expenditures  on nondurables  and services.  By 
the other  three  verdicts,  however,  the surcharge  was (at least!) 100  percent 
as effective as a standard  change in income on these components of 
consumption. 
Three of the four models produce  errors  on nondurables  and services 
during  the surcharge  period  that must  be regarded  as biased:  They clearly 
do not lie symmetrically  around  zero.  But  the errors  based  on the full-effect 
view  are  not large  in magnitude.  OBE  is the only  model  that ever  makes  an 
Table  3. Degree  of Effectiveness  of the 1968  Tax Surcharge  on 
Consumption,  1968:3-1970:3,  According  to Selected  Models 
Data  Office  of 
Resources,  Business 
Type  of expenditure  Inc.  Michigan Economics  Wharton 
Nondurable  goods and services  0.69  1.58  2.46  1.86 
Nonautodurables  1.29  1.11  -2.05  0.69 
Autos  -0.86  -3.62  -6.85  -0.69 
Total nonauto consumption 
Without constraint  0.82  1.48  1.31  1.62 
With 0,1 constraint"  0.74  1.00  0.78  0.93 
Total consumption 
Without constraint  0.53  0.47  0.34  1.33 
With 0,1 constraint"  0.63  0.88  0.70  0.80 
With auto adjustments  0.59  0.88  0.70  0.80 
Source: Based on methods set forth in text of appendix; effectiveness  is computed over the period 1968:3- 
1970:3 using tabulations set forth in Table 2. 
a.  For explanation of constraints and adjustments, see text. Arthur  M. Okun  191 
Table  4. Root-Mean-Square  Errors  of Full-Effect  and 
Zero-Effect  Simulations 
Billions of 1958 dollars 
Office  of 
Data  Business 
Resources,  Inc.  Michigan  Economics  Wharton 
Type  of  Full  Zero  Full  Zero  Full  Zero  Full  Zero 
expenditure  effeect effect  effect  effect  effect  effect  effect  effect 
Nondurable  goods 
and services  1.0  1.8  1.9  3.7  3.6  5.7  2.2  4.1 
Nonauto durables  0.7  0.9  1.1  1.4  2.7  2.2  0.7  0.8 
Autos  1.7  1.2  3.3  2.9  3.3  3.0  1.5  1.3 
Total consumption 
except autos  1.2  2.5  2.8  5.0  1.5  4.0  2.4  4.6 
Source: Computed for the period 1968:3 through 1970:3 from data in Table 2. 
error  as large  as 1 percent  of the total of consumer  outlays  on nondurables 
and services.  While  there  is no standard  statistical  measure  of par  for such 
dynamic  simulations,  the root-mean-square  errors  for nondurables  and 
services  (Table  4) must  be regarded  as quite  respectable.20  The errors  of the 
zero-effect  view are nearly  twice as large as those of the full-effect  view. 
Static  errors  for nondurables  and services  (available  from the author on 
request)  tend to correct  the overpredictions  as time goes on; but all ex- 
cept DRI still contain  a mean overprediction  based  on the full-effect  view 
and, of course,  larger  overpredictions  on the zero-effect  view. Although 
they  blur  the distinctions,  the static  residuals  are  consistent  with  the general 
verdict  in favor  of the full-effect  view  for expenditures  on nondurables  and 
services  during  the surcharge  period. They also indicate  that the results 
cannot be attributed  to any peculiarity  of the dynamic  simulation  nor 
specifically  to the choice of 1967:2 as the last known quarter.  (Further 
evidence  on this issue is presented  in the appendix.) 
20. "Root-mean-square  error"  is a standard  statistical  concept of average  error  that 
gives extra weight to particularly  large deviations. The errors are squared, and the 
square  root of the average  squared  error  is taken.  In a dynamic  simulation  over  a consid- 
erable  period,  the root-mean-square  error  is expected  to be larger  than  the standard  error 
over the sample period, because the dynamic simulation does not get the benefit of 
correction  from actual  lagged  expenditure.  Standard  errors  during  the sample  period  for 
nondurables  and services  are in the neighborhood  of $1.2 billion to $1.5 billion. The 
root-mean-square  errors  during  the simulation  period  for the full-effect  view in three  of 
the models are roughly one to one and one-half times that size-surely  as good as 
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Still, it is puzzling  that three of the four models overpredicted  nondu- 
rables  and services  consistently  during  the surcharge  period.  There  is no 
evident  built-in  tendency  for the models  to "run  uphill"  on these compo- 
nents.  I have  some  suspicion  that  the difference  between  DRI and  the other 
models  may be related  to the use of current-dollar  variables  by DRI. As a 
percentage  of disposable  income,  outlays  on nondurables  and services  for 
1968:3-1970:3 were about the same in current  dollars  as in the period 
1965:1-196,8:2;  but  they  were  about  0.7 percentage  point  lower  in constant 
dollars.  Price  variables  could  in principle  take  care  of this difference,  but it 
is not obvious  that they would. 
Three of the four consumption  models suggest  that any puzzle about 
consumer  spending  on nondurables  and services  during the surcharge 
period  is why it was so low. The surcharge  is one element  that was sup- 
posed  to hold consumption  down,  and  it does not look at all suspect  from 
this point of view.  The models  do not reveal  what  else could  be accounting 
for the extra downward  tug on consumption,  and they necessarily  leave 
open  the possibility  that the surcharge  may  have  been  ineffective  but made 
to look good by other forces that exerted  very  large downward  pulls on 
consumer  demand.  In summary,  the data  provide  no reason  for questioning 
the effectiveness  of the surcharge  on those components  of consumption 
where  the basic  challenge  of the permanent  income  hypothesis  was  focused. 
NONAUTO  DURABLES 
As recorded  in Table  2, the expected  impact  of the surcharge  on nonauto 
durables  expenditure  is quite similar  among the models, with the 1969 
impact  ranging  from  a low of $0.6  billion  for DRI to a high of $0.9  billion 
for Michigan.  For the first  half of 1970,  the expected  impact  ranges  from 
$0.4  billion  to $0.6  billion.  Lags  are short  for this component;  and, on the 
full-effect  view,  the surcharge  is expected  to curb  these  outlays  a little  more 
than proportionately. 
The OBE model consistently  underpredicts  nonauto durables  in every 
quarter  for both the full-effect  and the zero-effect  versions.21 The other 
21. Curiously,  the errors  for nondurables  and services  and those for nonauto durables 
in the OBE model are strongly  offsetting.  The combined  OBE estimates  (covering  con- 
sumption  excluding  autos) are remarkably  accurate  on the full-effect  view, as Table 4 
reveals. Arthur M. Okun  193 
three models hand down a quite different  verdict, however;  they con- 
sistently  overpredict  on the basis of the zero-effect  view (see Table  2). Of 
the nine  quarters  of observations,  overpredictions  occur  in eight  cases  each 
for DRI and  Michigan  and  seven  for Wharton.  On  the other  hand,  in these 
three  models,  the full-effect  view  gives  results  that are  essentially  unbiased: 
The signs  of the errors  are  split  5 to 4 consistently,  and  the mean  error  over 
the nine quarters  ranges  between  a negative  $0.3  billion  for Michigan  to a 
positive  amount  of less  than $0.1  billion  for  Wharton.  As shown  in Table  4, 
the root-mean-square  errors  for the models other than OBE are not far 
larger  than the roughly  $0.5 billion  standard  errors  of the sample  period; 
moreover,  they are uniformly  smaller  for the full-effect  than for the zero- 
effect  view, although  not by a wide  margin.  The measured  degree  of effec- 
tiveness  (Table  3) in these three  models  is close to unity, again  consistent 
with the full-effect  view. 
AUTOMOBILES 
According  to the full-effect  view as interpreted  by the four models,  the 
surcharge  should  have had a prompt  and marked  impact  on automobile 
demand,  curbing  outlays  by between  $0.5 billion and $0.6 billion in 1969. 
But there  is no evidence  whatsoever  that it had any impact.  Indeed,  even 
the zero-effect  view consistently  underpredicts  automobile  outlays  during 
the second  half of 1968 and every  quarter  of 1969. Only in 1970 do any 
overpredictions  appear  in any of the four  models:  DRI and  Wharton  then 
overpredict  on both bases, while OBE and Michigan  continue  to under- 
predict.  But  by 1970,  the expected  impact  of the surcharge  on autos,  on the 
full-effect  view,  is negligible-even in a few  cases,  paradoxically  stimulative 
because  of auto stock or income-change  effects. 
As shown in Table 2, the underpredictions  of OBE and Michigan  are 
consistently  in the range  of $3 billion  to $5 billion for the second  half of 
1968 and throughout  1969. For the entire surcharge  period, Michigan's 
and  OBE's  root-mean-square  errors  (Table  4) are  three  times  the size  of the 
$1 billion standard  error during  the sample  period.  Wharton  and DRI 
have  much  smaller  root-mean-square  errors.  They  also underestimate  dur- 
ing the first six quarters  of the surcharge  period,  but by a considerably 
smaller  average:  $1.8 billion  for DRI and $1.3 billion  for Wharton. 
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mobile  stock  have a significant  effect  on current  demand  for autos;  that is 
probably  one reason  for their  smaller  underpredictions.  The rapid  buildup 
of the stock  in 1964-68  tends  to generate  low estimates  of demand  for 1968 
and 1969  in the OBE and Michigan  models.22  The stock market  variable 
of DRI and  the interest  rate structure  variable  of Wharton  may also help; 
neither  Michigan  nor OBE  has any credit  or financial  variable  in the auto 
equation.  Finally,  the inclusion  of much  of this period  in the sample  period 
for Wharton  and DRI may have improved  their estimates.  It is beyond 
the scope of this paper  to explore  more fully the possibilities  that might 
have accounted  for the consistent  underprediction  of automobile  demand 
in the second  half  of 1968  and  in 1969.  On  the basis  of the test of this  paper, 
I find absolutely  no evidence  that automobile  demand  was held down by 
the surcharge. 
SUMMARY  OF EMPIRICAL  FINDINGS 
The four models agree  remarkably  on the amount  that the surcharge 
"should"  have  curbed  consumption  in accord  with  the full-effect  view.  The 
direct impact on real consumer  outlays was expected  to be about $2.5 
billion (annual  rate, as always  in 1958  prices)  in the second  half of 1968, 
$4 billion  in 1969,  and  between  $2.5 billion  and $3 billion  (annual  rate)  in 
the  first  half  of 1970.  During  the entire  interval,  a little  more  than  half  of the 
surcharge's  drain on disposable  income was expected  to be reflected  in 
consumer  outlays,  with a prolonged  small effect  continuing  after  the ex- 
piration  of the surcharge.  The expected  full-effect  impact, averaged  for 
the four models,  is shown  in Figure  2. 
The divergence  between  the results  on automobile  outlays  and those on 
other  consumption  complicates  the task of drawing  conclusions  about  the 
actual  effectiveness  of the surcharge.  On the average,  about 14 percent  of 
the expected  direct  impact  was supposed  to fall on automobiles,  but no 
evidence  was uncovered  that automobile  demand  was, in fact, held down 
by the surcharge.  On the other  hand, when consumption  of nondurables 
and services  during  the surcharge  period  is interpreted  in light of the full- 
effect  view, demand  appears  to be fairly  weak rather  than strong.  Hence 
the evidence  offers  no reason  to doubt the effectiveness  of the surcharge 
22. See the discussion  of this point by Saul H. Hymans, "Consumer  Durable  Spend. 
ing: Explanation and Prediction," Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity (2:1970), 
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in that broad area.  According  to three of the four models,  the surcharge 
was (at least) 100 percent  effective  on nondurable  goods and services  in 
the sense  that  it had  as much  impact  per  dollar  as would  have  been  expected 
from  the loss of an equal  amount  of other  income.  However,  in the fourth 
model (DRI), the surcharge  is estimated  as 69 percent  effective  on non- 
durable  goods and services.  The clear  verdict  on nondurables  and services 
is of particular  interest,  because  the  transitory  income  view  of the surcharge 
points  to a low degree  of effectiveness  for these components. 
For nonauto  durables,  the verdict  is essentially  the same.  Three  of the 
models  show a degree  of effectiveness  ranging  between  0.7 and 1.3, while 
OBE shows no restraint.  I find it reasonable  to sum up these results  by 
imposing  theoretical  restrictions  on the estimated  effectiveness  of each 
component.  On analytical  grounds,  I am unwilling  to believe  that the sur- 
charge  could have  had greater  than full effectiveness  (that  is, more  impact 
per dollar  than a loss of other  income)  in curbing  consumption  excluding 
automobiles.  But neither  can I believe  that the surcharge  actually  had a 
stimulative effect on automobile  demand.  In line with these theoretical 
beliefs,  I take as the summary  measure  of overall  effectiveness  a weighted 
average  of the estimated  impact  on nondurables  and services,  on nonauto 
durables,  and on autos,  but do not allow the estimate  for any component 
to exceed  100  percent  or  to be less  than  zero.23  Then,  the  estimated  effective- 
ness on nondurables  and services  is taken  as unity  for the Michigan,  OBE, 
and  Wharton  models,  and at 0.69 for DRI. The estimated  effectiveness  for 
nonauto durables  is then zero for OBE, unity for DRI and Michigan, 
and 0.69 for Wharton.  The estimated  effectiveness  for autos is zero in all 
four  models.  The  appropriate  weight  of autos  in the average  is the expected 
direct  impact  on that  component  as a fraction  of the total direct  impact  on 
consumption  over the period; it is 16 percent  for DRI, 12 percent  for 
Michigan,  12 percent  for OBE,  and 14 percent  for Wharton.  Allowing  for 
this dilution,  and some dilution  on nonauto outlays,  the effectiveness  of 
the surcharge  on total consumption  is found  to be 63 percent  for DRI, 88 
percent  for Michigan,  70 percent  for OBE, and 80 percent  for Wharton. 
23. Imposing  these  constraints  on each of the three  components  involves  some danger 
of biasing results. If the surcharge  were, in fact, 100 percent  effective,  purely random 
errors would result in the estimated  effectiveness  for some components  exceeding 100 
percent  and others  lying below 100  percent.  If no figure  above 100  percent  were  accepted, 
the result  would be biased downward.  Similarly,  if the true degree  of effectiveness  were 
zero, ignoring  negative  values  for some components  while accepting  positive  ones would 
bias the result  upward. Arthur M.  Okun  197 
If no constraints  are  placed  on the results  for the components,  then one 
is obliged  to argue  that  the surcharge  had  a stimulative  effect  on automobile 
demand.  Indeed,  the result would interpret  each dollar of surcharge  as 
equivalent  to a rise in disposable  income  of between  69 cents  (Wharton)  and 
$6.85  (OBE)  in its impact  on auto demand.  By the same  token, one has to 
defend  Michigan,  OBE,  and  Wharton  verdicts  that the surcharge  was 148, 
131, and 162  percent,  respectively,  effective  in curbing  nonauto  consump- 
tion. I find such an interpretation  absurd.  For example,  that approach 
would  have  ruled  the surcharge  100  percent  effective  if it had  zero  indicated 
effectiveness  on nonauto consumption  and a coefficient  of 800 percent 
effectiveness  on autos.  For the same  reason  that such  a result  could  not be 
taken  seriously,  neither  can  the negative  coefficient  actually  found  for  autos. 
Just for the record,  nonetheless,  the no-constraint  approach  yields  coeffi- 
cients  of overall  effectiveness  of 34 percent  for OBE,  47 percent  for Michi- 
gan, 53 percent  for DRI, and 133  percent  for Wharton. 
While the extraordinarily  strong  demand  for automobiles  cannot rea- 
sonably  be interpreted  as a result  of the surcharge,  the weakness  of demand 
for other consumption  categories  might conceivably  have been, to some 
degree,  a mirror  image  of the intensity  of automobile  demand.  Consumers 
may have held down other  expenditures  in order  to fulfill  their desire  to 
spend more on cars. In that event, the strength  of automobile  demand 
would have worked  along with the surcharge  to curb outlays for other 
components  of consumption. 
In fact, DRI has investigated  the relationship  between  errors  on auto- 
mobile demand  and other components  and has found that unexpectedly 
high expenditures  on automobiles  are normally  associated  with especially 
low outlays  on nonauto  durables.  According  to their  results,  an extra  dol- 
lar spent  on cars  above  normal  rates  is associated  with 30 cents  less spend- 
ing on nonauto durables  and 70 cents less saving.  If this adjustment  is 
made during  the surcharge  period  to the estimated  demand  for nonauto 
durables,  the coefficient  of overall  effectiveness  is reduced  from 63 to 59 
percent.  But the adjustment  actually  worsens  the predictions  of nonauto 
durables  within  the surcharge  period,  raising  the root-mean-square  error 
from $0.7 billion  to $0.9 billion. 
One  implication  of the mirror  image  hypothesis  would  be that the quar- 
ters during  the surcharge  period  when automobile  demand  was especially 
strong  should  have been the quarters  in which  nonauto  consumption  de- 
mand  was especially  weak.  For Michigan,  the reverse  was true: Errors  in 198  Brookings  Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1971 
autos and errors  in nonauto consumption  were positively  related. For 
Wharton,  there  was no relationship  between  the two sets of errors.  How- 
ever, DRI and OBE both displayed  a modest negative  relationship.  The 
DRI result was consistent  with the adjustment  made above. The OBE 
result  for the surcharge  period  suggests  that of an extra  dollar  of auto out- 
lays, 77 cents  comes out of saving  and 23 cents out of nonauto  consump- 
tion. If this  information  is used  to generate  a new  series  of OBE  predictions 
for nonauto consumption,  assuming  that automobile  demand  is known 
in advance,  the OBE coefficient  of effectiveness  for nondurables  and ser- 
vices  remains  above  100  percent.  The  results  on the surcharge  are  thus  quite 
firm,  although  the behavior  of automobile  demand  remains  enshrouded  in 
mystery.  The estimated  effectiveness  based on the auto adjustment  line of 
Table 3 was translated  into dollars  and averaged  for the four models; it 
is shown  in Figure  2, and is close to the expected  impact. 
In conclusion,  the evidence  of the surcharge  period  as interpreted  by four 
econometric  models indicates that the surcharge  curbed consumption 
nearly  as much  as was expected  in the models,  and  that any shortcomings 
in its effectiveness  have no evident  connection  to the permanent  income 
hypothesis. 
Perspective on the Results 
These  detailed  statistical  findings  stand  in marked  contrast  to some  intui- 
tive conclusions  that the surcharge  was ineffective  in curbing  consumer 
outlays.24  In part,  that widespread  impression  may stem  from  the unusual 
strength  of automobile  demand during much of the surcharge  period. 
Secondly,  the reputation  may be attributable  to the extreme  weakness  of 
consumer  demand  in the spring  of 1968,  the quarter  immediately  preceding 
the initiation  of the surcharge.  From  the second  to the third  quarter,  con- 
sumer  outlays  of all types rose unusually  sharply.  But the second  quarter 
had been an especially  dismal  period  for soft goods. All the models  over- 
predicted  the sum  of nondurables  and  services  substantially  in that  quarter: 
DRI by $1.3 billion; Wharton  by $2.4 billion; Michigan  by $2.7 billion, 
and  OBE  by $3.8  billion.  During  the spring  of 1968,  the press  reported  the 
24. On the other  hand, for two professional  views consistent  with the findings  of this 
study, see Paul W. McCracken,  Statement  before the House Ways and Means Com- 
mittee, May 20, 1969, and Murray L. Weidenbaum,  "Fiscal Policy for a Period of 
Transition,"  Federal  Reserve  Bank of St. Louis Review,  Vol. 52 (November 1970), pp. 
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disappointing  performance  of retail sales, attributing  it in part to the 
assassination  of Martin  Luther  King and subsequent  civil disturbances  in 
several  urban  areas.  Nonetheless,  these data were  fresh  in people's  minds 
during  the summer  of 1968, and the large  rises  from those pre-surcharge 
benchmarks  seemed  distressing.  In retrospect,  it is clear  that  the abnormal- 
ity of that period  with respect  to nonauto  consumption  was not that the 
third  quarter  was unusually  strong  but that the second  quarter  was espe- 
cially  weak. 
Furthermore,  the reputation  of the personal  tax surcharge  may have 
been sullied  by unreasonable  expectations  rather  than inadequate  accom- 
plishments.  And I am personally  obliged to concede that unreasonable 
expectations  may have stemmed  in part  from a possible  overselling  of the 
measure  by officials  of the Johnson  administration  who had to convince  a 
reluctant,  recalcitrant  Congress  and skeptical  public  of the need for fiscal 
restraint.  It may have also stemmed  from overly eager  journalists  who 
dissected  retail sales reports  during  the summer  of 1968 in an effort  to 
reach  a verdict  on the success  of the surcharge.  The expected  direct  impact 
of the surcharge  in that quarter  was so small  that it could not have been 
visible  in monthly  retail  sales  data.25 
Another  source  of intuitive  disappointment  may  be the tendency  to focus 
on the saving rate-the  ratio of personal  saving to disposable  personal 
income-as  the key indicator  of the strength  of consumer  demand.  This 
practice  implicitly  translates  changes  in income  into expected  changes  in 
consumption  immediately,  unlike the time-consuming  process that is 
embodied  in the econometric  models.  In the models,  any  change  in income 
has gradually  increasing  effects  on nondurables  and services;  a year after 
an income  change  has  begun,  only  50 to 60 percent  of it is expected  to show 
up in consumption.26  The models  teach  the important  general  lesson that 
25. On September  18, 1968, I said: "My statistical  estimates  would project [the sur- 
charge's]  impact  on GNP during  the third  quarter  at $2 billion....  There  is no evidence 
yet visible-even in the CEA microscope-that the surcharge  has moderated  the pace of 
consumer spending. But there was never any reason to believe that there should be 
evidence of this nature  by now." Arthur  M. Okun, "Perspectives  on Business  in 1969," 
Conference  Board  Record,  Vol. 5 (November 1968),  p. 22. 
26. The single aggregate  consumption  equation  I employed  in my 1965 paper  on the 
tax cut worked  somewhat  faster  than these models;  it implied  that, four quarters  after  an 
income change was initiated,  consumption  was affected  by 80 percent  of the change in 
income. I am not totally convinced  that the lag structure  of these models is accurate; 
indeed,  too slow a process  could be one source  of the overpredictions  of nondurables  and 
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it takes  time for tax changes-whether  permanent  or temporary-to build 
up to their  complete  direct  impact  on consumption. 
By the verdict  of the models,  however,  the personal  tax surcharge  was 
no placebo.  In curbing  consumption  directly  by most of the expected  $4 
billion (1958 prices)  in 1969, the surcharge  also must have triggered  off 
important  multiplier  and accelerator  effects,  and  must  have  had significant 
induced  effects  on prices  by dampening  demand.  It can easily  be credited 
with curbing  the growth  of money GNP by at least 1 percent  during  its 
initial  year of operation. 
Nonetheless,  both real and money GNP continued  to exceed policy 
targets until late in 1969. As discussed  above, automobile  demand  dis- 
played surprising  strength.  Business  investment  rose sharply,  defying all 
forecasts.  Homebuilding  meanwhile  proved  to be resistant  to rises in in- 
terest  rates.  Two  weak  monthly  reports  on housing  starts  for May and  June 
1968  (which  subsequently  turned  out  to be erratic)  contributed  substantially 
to the misassessment  of the true strength  of private  demand  and to the 
mistakes  in monetary  policy in the summer  of 1968. Later on, when the 
boom was finally  halted  by a combination  of fiscal  and  monetary  restraint, 
inflation  proved  to be remarkably  immune  to market  forces. 
All of this history  merely  documents  a misdiagnosis  of the economic 
situation.  But it is important  to recognize  the nature  of the errors  in eco- 
nomic diagnosis  and prescription.  According  to the evidence  cited above, 
the medicine  of the personal  tax surcharge  did lower  the patient's  fever.  To 
be sure,  the patient  was  more  feverish  than  the doctors  recognized  and  con- 
sequently  their  antifever  prescription  was inadequate.  But don't  blame  the 
medicine;  it did most of what it should  reasonably  have been expected  to 
do. In short,  the evidence  of the surcharge  period  provides  further  confir- 
mation  of the general  efficacy  and  continued  desirability  of flexible  changes 
in  personal income tax rates-upward  or  downward, permanent or 
temporary. Arthur  M. Okun  201 
APPENDIX* 
THIS  APPENDIX  CONTAINS  TWO  PARTS.  The first  explains  the derivation 
of the coefficient  of effectiveness  statistic shown in Table 3 and used in 
the text. The second part discusses  the significance  of the use of 1967:2 
as the last known quarter  in the dynamic  simulation.  A supplementary 
appendix,  available  upon  request,  gives  the prediction  errors  resulting  from 
static  simulations  of the four econometric  models  for the surcharge  period 
and lists their  equations  of the consumption  sector. 
Measurement  of Degree  of Effectiveness 
Suppose  the surcharge  had some  impact  per dollar  in curbing  consump- 
tion but only a fraction  a (O  < a <  1) as much as a dollar  loss of income 
from other  sources.  The "proper"  income  variable  is then neither  official 
disposable  income  (Y), which  is the choice of the full-effect  view, nor the 
zero-effect  concept  that adds back the surcharge  (S) to get (Y +  S), but 
something  in between:  Y +  (1 -  a)S. If M, the impact  calculated  accord- 
ing to the full-effect  view,  is linear  and  homogeneous  in current  and  lagged 
S, then the impact  attributed  to the surcharge  in the partial-effect  view is 
aM. The predicted  value of consumption  in the partial-effect  view will be 
below  that of the zero-effect  view by aM, and the residual  (W) will exceed 
the zero-effect  residual  (V) by aM: 
(1)  W=  V+aM. 
Over  the period  of observations,  the sum  of squared  errors  of predictions 
based  on the partial-effect  view is 
(2)  W2  =  5V2  +  2a5,MV  +  a2  M2. 
To determine  a*, that value of a most consistent  with the evidence,  one 
should minimize  the sum of squared  errors  in (2). First differentiate  (2) 
with respect  to a: 
(3)  d(2W2)  =  2ZMV  +  2aEM2. 
da 
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Assuming  the existence  of an extremum  (necessarily  a minimum),  set (3) 
equal  to zero and solve for a*: 
-EMV 
(4)  a  M2 
Figures  in the text and in Table  3 referring  to the "degree  of effective- 
ness"  are values  of a*. 
The OBE, Wharton, and Michigan models are in  accord with the 
assumption  that M is linear  and homogeneous  in S; DRI departs  from it 
in only one trivial  respect,  through  its percentage  income-change  variable 
in the auto equation. 
The calculated  a* is not constrained  to lie between  zero and unity. If 
the Vs tend to be positive  (that is, if even the zero-effect  view underesti- 
mates consumption),  then the calculated  degree of effectiveness  will be 
negative:  a* < 0. On the other  hand,  if the Vs are  negative  and  tend  to be 
larger  in absolute  value  than M, so that even  the full-effect  view generally 
overestimates  consumption,  a* will turn out to be greater  than unity. 
Choice  of the Last Known  Quarter 
As discussed  in the main body of the paper,  the technique  of dynamic 
simulation  requires  that the investigator  be "blindfolded"  with respect 
to information  on actual consumption  expenditures  after some point. 
From that point on, he is compelled  to use his own predicted  values of 
consumption  whenever  lagged  consumption  is an explanatory  variable  in 
an equation.  It was decided  in advance  to use 1967:2 as the last quarter 
for which actual  consumer  spending  was to be known.  After the simula- 
tions were completed,  a check was made on the Michigan  and Wharton 
models to see how other choices for the last known quarter  would have 
altered  the results. 
Whenever  lagged  consumption  is an explanatory  variable,  the strength 
of demand  (relative  to that predicted  by the equation)  in the last known 
quarter  affects  the subsequent  track  of predicted  values.  If consumer  out- 
lays are especially  strong  in that quarter,  then the predicted  value  for the 
next quarter  is higher  because  it includes  some positive  coefficient  multi- 
plied by the expenditure  of that last known quarter.  If the coefficient  on 
lagged  consumption  expenditure  is far below unity, the effect  of strength 
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it is in some of the equations  for nondurable  goods and services,  then the 
residual  of the last known  quarter  exerts  a substantial  impact  on the track 
of predicted  values  for a considerable  period. 
None of the four  models  used  in this  study  was  very  far  from  the mark  on 
nondurables  and services in  1967:2, although all four overpredicted: 
Wharton  by $0.4 billion,  DRI by $0.7 billion, Michigan  by $1.1 billion, 
and OBE  by $1.7 billion.  In the case of nonauto  durables,  Michigan  is the 
only model  in which  lagged  expenditure  enters  significantly  as an explana- 
tory variable;  the Michigan  model predicted  nonauto  durables  exactly  in 
1967:2.  In the case  of autos,  lagged  expenditure  is included  in the Michigan 
and  OBE  models  in a significant  way;  both underpredicted  this component 
in 1967:2,  Michigan  by $0.9 billion  and OBE by $2.1 billion. 
The use of every quarter  from 1966:1 to  1968:2 as the last known 
quarter  was explored  for Michigan.  In the case of automobiles,  the choice 
turns  out to have  no significance  at all: Every  one of the ten hypothetical 
jumping-off  points  leads  to exactly  the same  errors  to the nearest  tenth of 
a billion  dollars  after  1969:  1; at the start  of the surcharge  period  in 1968:3 
the biggest  difference  of any simulation  from  that employed  in this paper 
is only $0.3 billion. This result reflects  the fact that the coefficient  on 
lagged automobile  expenditures  is 0.34, small enough to decay rapidly. 
In the case of nonauto durables,  the highest  track of predicted  values 
would have been obtained  with 1966:3 as the last known quarter.  In 
1968:3,  that  track  is $0.4  billion  above  the one actually  employed  with the 
1967:2  jumping-off  point;  but  the difference  diminishes  to only $0.2  billion 
in 1969:3, and is down to $0.1 billion by 1970:3. On the other  extreme, 
the lowest  track  of predicted  values  would  have  been  obtained  with 1967:3 
as the  jumping-off  point, and  that track  differs  from  the one actually  used 
by $0.2 billion  in 1968:3 and only $0.1 billion in 1970:3. None of these 
alternative  choices  would  have  made  a qualitative  difference  in the findings. 
In the case of nondurable  goods and services,  the various  tracks  of pre- 
dicted values differ substantially  and remain far apart throughout  the 
surcharge  period.  The choice of 1966:1, 1966:2, 1966:3, and 1967:1 as 
the last known quarter  would have yielded  an even higher  track of pre- 
dicted  values  than  did  that actually  employed  and  thus  would  have  resulted 
consistently  in even larger overpredictions  of actual spending  on non- 
durables  and services.  The choice of 1968:1 as the last known quarter 
would have yielded a track essentially  indistinguishable  from that of 
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quarters  of consumer  spending on nondurables  and services,  such as 
1966:4, 1967:3, 1967:4, and 1968:2,  would have resulted  in lower  tracks 
of predicted  values than did that actually employed in the dynamic 
simulation. 
The only  jumping-off  point that would have changed  Michigan's  basic 
conclusions  on nondurables  and services  would have been 1968:2. Re- 
flecting  the extreme  weakness  of consumer  demand  for these  items during 
that quarter,  the subsequent  track of predicted  values for the full-effect 
view  would  have  been  enough  lower  to produce  an average  underprediction 
of consumer  spending  on nondurables  and services  during  the surcharge 
period. Quite apart from the extreme  weakness  of consumer  demand 
during  that  quarter,  any  economist  planning  such  an experiment  in advance 
would  have  decided  not to use the quarter  immediately  preceding  the sur- 
charge  as the last known quarter  for dynamic  simulation  just because  it 
would  emphasize  whatever  errors  or shocks  occurred  in that quarter.  The 
rationale  of any dynamic  simulation  argues  for getting  a head  start  several 
quarters  before the surcharge  period. The next lowest track of the ten 
possibilities  explored  took 1967:4 as the last known quarter;  on the full- 
effect  view, it would have shown  nearly  unbiased  results  with an average 
underprediction  of $0.2 billion a quarter  during the surcharge  period. 
Every other possible  jumping-off  point that was explored  yielded sub- 
stantial  average  overpredictions,  as did the one actually  employed. 
The Wharton  model  has a coefficient  of 0.37 on lagged  expenditures  for 
nondurables,  and this effect  decays  rapidly;  no jumping-off  point between 
1966:1 and 1968:2 produces  differences  amounting  to more than $0.3 
billion  in any observed  quarter  after  1968:3.  In the case of services,  which 
have a coefficient  on lagged  expenditures  of 0.98 in the Wharton  model, a 
few of the tracks  are  considerably  different  from  the one actually  employed 
with  the 1967:2  jumping-off  point.  The highest  track  of predicted  values  is 
that employing  1966:  1 as the last known  quarter:  At the start  of the sur- 
charge  period in 1968:3, it is $0.6 billion above the track actually  em- 
ployed, and at the end of the surcharge  period  in 1970:3 it is still $0.5 
billion higher  than the track used above. The lowest track of predicted 
values  takes 1968:2 as the last known  quarter;  it runs  consistently  about 
$1.2 billion below the track that was actually  employed.  But even that 
lowest  track  of the ten yields an average  overprediction  of service  outlays 
on the full-effect  view, overpredicting  in six of the nine quarters  of the 
surcharge  period. Comments  and 
Discussion 
Saul  Hymans:  The obvious  hallmarks  of Okun's  paper  are analytical  care 
and  clarity  of presentation.  That  makes  my task  extremely  difficult.  In fact, 
it leaves  me with very  few options  if I want  to speak  longer  than  it takes  to 
congratulate  the author.  One  option  is to deliver  a paper  of my own,  thereby 
saying  to the original  author,  "You  wrote  a fine  paper,  except  that it is the 
wrong  one."  I will not choose  that option,  because  I believe  the right  paper 
was written.  Another  option  is to allow  myself  a bit of careless  abandon  in 
contrast  to the analytical  care  exercised  in the paper.  Are there  then somec- 
wild,  tentative  inferences  that  might  be worth  thinking  about  in our  studies 
of either  consumer  behavior  or fiscal  policy? 
Let me postulate  that it is mid-1968,  and consumers  are becoming  con- 
vinced that inflation is serious and growing  worse. At the very least, 
wealth portfolios  will have to be adjusted,  shifting  away from financial 
assets  and toward  real goods. An obvious  way to do this at the margin  is 
to buy more automobiles  at the cost of lower financial  savings.  Indeed, 
it might even be necessary  to accumulate  more wealth  by forgoing  some 
expenditures  on nondurable  goods and services.  Now the surcharge  is in- 
troduced  into this environment,  and  threatens  a diminution  in the accumu- 
lation  of wealth  precisely  at a time  when  it appears  that  the composition  of 
wealth  is wrong  and  its rate  of growth  inadequate  for future  needs.  To cut 
back on auto expenditures  is precisely  the wrong  response  when  the need 
is for more real wealth.  In order  to prevent  any decline  in the growth  of 
total wealth,  the increase  in auto spending  is financed  by a relative  reduc- 
tion in expenditures  on nondurables  rather  than  a relative  drop  in financial 
savings. 
Suppose  this story  were  true.  How does  it then  appear  to the econometric 
eye trying  to track  the surcharge?  It makes  the surcharge  look more  than 
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100  percent  effective  with respect  to nondurables  and services  and  perverse 
with  respect  to automobile  expenditures.  Admittedly,  this is a story  cooked 
up to explain  the observed  data.  But  it is not that farfetched,  at least not at 
the margin.  The appropriate  test of this  tale is not in the quarter-to-quarter 
movements  of automobiles  and  nondurables,  but  rather  in the nine-quarter 
trend  over  the period. 
Consumer  spending  on durable  goods is not just another  category  of 
consumption.  It is a category  of wealth accumulation,  of investment.  It 
is under  the control  of those  individuals  who feel  the quick  and  direct  effect 
of changes  in tax policy.  We are  never  quite  sure  what  business  tax rates  are 
going  to do to business  fixed  investment  in any short  interval  of time.  And 
the same  is true of the impact  of changes  in personal  tax rates  on personal 
fixed  investment.  This uncertainty  makes  the conduct  of fiscal  policy  much 
more  complicated.  It is not possible  simply  to apply  multipliers  to estimates 
of the effect  of tax changes  in order  to derive  the economic  impact. 
Lester  Taylor: Arthur  Okun  has done an important  and relevant  piece of 
work.  In my opinion,  the mechanics  of the experiment  gave  the permanent 
income  hypothesis  a fair  test, or at least as fair a test as is possible.  I find 
convincing  his conclusion  that,  whatever  the reasons  why consumer  spend- 
ing was  not curtailed  following  the surcharge  as fully  as expected,  they  were 
not such as to confirm  the permanent  income hypothesis.  If consumers 
spent according  to the permanent  income  hypothesis,  and viewed  the sur- 
charge  as only a transitory  reduction  in income,  then the bulk of its effect 
should  have been seen in durable  goods and in the rate of saving.  Its ob- 
served  effects  on nondurable  goods and services  should  have  been negligi- 
ble. However,  as the results  show, neither  of these two predictions  ma- 
terialized.  On the average,  expenditures  for nondurable  goods and services 
were  pretty  much  in line  with  the predictions  based  on a full  effect  from  the 
surtax,  while  expenditures  for automobiles  and parts  actually  boomed. 
Let me now turn to a few smaller  matters.  Any consumption  function 
worth its salt these days is dynamic.  Typically,  this takes the form of 
including  expenditures  of the preceding  period as a predictive  variable. 
The presence  of a lag term  tends to impart  spurious  accuracy  to the pre- 
dicted values because  of the positive autocorrelation  that is inherent  in 
economic  time series.  Because  of this, Okun  properly  used dynamic  rather 
than static  simulation.  However,  I would  take  issue  with his interpretation 
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proposition  that expenditures  in the current  quarter  for gasoline  depend  in 
part  on previous  expenditures  for gasoline  does  not imply  a causal  relation- 
ship;  it implies  rather  that  lagged  expenditures  are  designed  to reflect  habit 
formation  and the persistence  of consumer  tastes through  time. I think 
that whether  the lagged  expenditure  term  has causal  significance  depends 
upon the particular  rationale  of the model and, incidentally,  upon one's 
view  of causality.  What  I have  in mind,  continuing  the example  of gasoline, 
is that current  expenditures  would be related  to income  through  a state 
variable  reflecting  the force of habit, that state variable  is not observable 
and its place  is taken  by the expenditures  of the last period.  On this view 
these have a causal  interpretation.  I would also modify  his statement  that 
lagged  expenditures  necessarily  reflect  habit  formation.  They  can also have 
other  interpretations,  which  do not suggest  short-run  inertia  in spending. 
For some commodities,  especially  durable  goods, the existence  of inven- 
tories is represented  by lagged expenditures  and results  in stock adjust- 
ment spending  responses  as incomes  change.  Whether  or not lagged ex- 
penditures  stand in for a state variable  representing  habit or inventories, 
the result  will be a positive  coefficient  on last period's  expenditures.  But 
the coefficient  for goods characterized  by habit formation  and short-run 
inertia will typically be 0.8 or higher, while the coefficient  for goods 
characterized  by inventories  and stock adjustments  will be on the order 
of 0.5 or even  lower. 
Robert  Eisner:  Many of us questioned  the surcharge  as a device  to fight 
inflation on a number of grounds, some political-economic, some frankly 
political. The political-economic reasons related to  a whole complex of 
forces. We felt that the main forces pushing toward inflation were the 
government expenditures for the war. It did not seem possible to divorce 
tax policy from expenditure policy. A  refusal to go ahead with the sur- 
charge  might actually  have led to cuts in government  expenditures  or at 
least restraints  on their increase.  On the economic  side, in the passage 
Okun quoted  from, I argued  that "the basic economic  error"  applied  to 
business investment as well as to consumption. Okun essentially concedes 
my point on the trivial impact of the temporary corporate surcharge on 
investment.  And he ignores  the extension  of excise  taxes. He chooses to 
review only one piece of the fiscal program, the personal surcharge. 
Let us look at what happened. The GNP deflator rose at an accelerating 
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not come. Business  fixed investment  rose from $81.6 billion in 1966 to 
$99.3  billion  in 1969.  Consumption,  which  had  been  rising  at a rate  of 10.4 
percent  in the first  half of 1968,  rose  by 8.9 percent  in the last half,  7.5 per- 
cent in the first  half of 1969,  and 7.1 percent  in the last half of 1969.  The 
personal  saving  rate,  which  offers  a guide  to how consumers  are spending, 
was 7.6 percent  of disposable  income  in the second  quarter  of 1968,  just 
before  the imposition  of the surcharge,  and dropped  to 6.1 percent  in the 
third  quarter.  In the six quarters  before  the surcharge,  it averaged  7.4 per- 
cent;  it fell to an average  of 6.1 percent  the six quarters  after  the surcharge 
was imposed.  Looked  at in this crude  fashion,  the main effect  of the sur- 
charge  was simply  a reduction  in the saving  rate. 
Now let me focus more narrowly  on Okun's  paper.  He has pointed  to 
the reduction  in the real  rate  of growth  of output  after  the overall  stabiliza- 
tion policy  turned  more  restrictive;  but one  might  wonder  how  much  longer 
the  real  rate  of growth  could  have  been  expected  to continue  at the 61/2  per- 
cent rate that prevailed  in the first half of 1968. Given the ceiling on 
supply,  sooner or later we had to come down to lower rates of growth. 
In addition,  the impact of inflation  was uneven,  which, one might con- 
jecture,  might have had some inhibiting  influence  on real consumption. 
Okun himself  points out several  flaws  in the results  of the model. But 
he is encouraged  by the relatively  low root-mean-square  errors  for non- 
durable goods and services  in the prediction  period. Nonetheless, the 
root-mean-square  errors  are about the same magnitude  as the estimated 
surcharge  impacts  themselves.  The surcharge  itself was relatively  small 
in size and  the predicted  errors  about  the same  size. It is also troublesome 
that more than half of the unconstrained  values  for a*, the variable  de- 
veloped  to measure  the degree  of effectiveness  of the surcharge,  fall outside 
the reasonable  a priori  bounds of zero to one. I do not think that it is 
correct  to constrain  the individual  a* to these bounds  before forming  an 
overall measure  of surtax effectiveness.  The values given without con- 
straint  are a better  measure  of the effectiveness  of the surcharge  than the 
ones with the constraint,  and three  of these four estimates  range  from  34 
to 53 percent.  Okun further  concedes  that, if he had used 1968:2 as the 
starting  point for the dynamic  simulation,  his results would have been 
even closer  to the zero-effect  view. 
One thing that has been overlooked  is that the models,  in effect,  build 
in the permanent  income hypothesis  by making  current  consumption  a 
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disposable income or consumption as well. The variations in income over 
time are in considerable part transitory and that is why the models give a 
small response to  a  one-quarter or even a  one-year change in  income. 
When consumers experience a change in income and do not perceive it as 
permanent, they react slowly at first. If the rise in income persists, the 
consumer forms a firmer notion  that the  change is permanent and his 
assets rise and he spends more. During the first four quarters of the surtax 
I calculate that the models were predicting only 38 cents of reduction in 
consumption for each dollar of surtax. This may be compared with Okun's 
suggestion that Friedman expected a 33 cent response on the basis of his 
permanent income hypothesis. The fact that Okun finds, even with his 
constraint, that the surcharge is only 59 to 88 percent as effective as the 
models predicted indicates that the surcharge was viewed as even more 
transitory than other elements of income. 
I might add parenthetically that while I quite prefer the permanent in- 
come approach to  the "ratchet argument," Okun hardly does justice  to 
the latter. In this context, the ratchet would apply not merely, as  Okun 
suggests, to the "fraction of total income belonging to the group of families 
that was pushed from no change (or a minuscule rise) in income into the 
minus zone as the result of the surcharge."  It would rather apply as well to 
all those whose incomes without  the surcharge  were less than their previous 
peaks. Given both the variability of money incomes and the fact that the 
real incomes of many households were declining because of inflation, con- 
trary to Okun's conclusion, it is easy to believe that this group accounted 
for "a significant fraction of total  income," which would,  according to 
the ratchet argument, be  subject to  a quite low  marginal propensity to 
consume. 
Arthur  Okun: The expectation that the surcharge might have a dollar-for- 
dollar impact, a super-full effect overnight, was a mistake in some people's 
expectations of what it could do. As I said in the paper, I wonder whether 
the surcharge  may have been oversold and people expected too much from 
it. But that is not the issue here. The question is whether the surcharge, 
because it was temporary, was less effective in restraining consumption, 
particularly on  nondurable goods  and  services, than  a  permanent tax 
change would have been. What these models tell us is that consumption 
lags  behind incorte.  According to  these models,  it  takes nearly a year 
before a dollar change in income has a half-dollar direct effect on con- 210  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1971 
sumption. The effect is gradual regardless of the kind of income change. 
The results indicate that this tax increase worked no differently from what 
the models would have expected on the basis of a permanent tax increase, 
or an income change arising from any other cause. And it is critical that 
the permanent income hypothesis would stress nondurables and services 
as the key components for a test. 
I should like to respond to a couple of technical points. On the question 
of  whether to  constrain a* when adding up a measure of  effectiveness, 
doing otherwise seems absurd to me. Adding up without constraints says 
that the surcharge stimulated automobile demand and reduced nonauto 
demand with more than full effect. Applying the zero-to-one theoretical 
constraint is simply a systematic and symmetrical way of ruling out both 
these unrealistic interpretations. It should not  be  bothersome that pre- 
diction errors in the consumption function often lead to point estimates 
of a* outside that range. In comparing the errors to the estimated impact, 
one has to keep in mind the size of the surcharge and of the typical errors 
of  consumption equations. If  the  surcharge had been larger, or if  our 
econometric models  were more  accurate, there would  have been more 
discrimination. The fact that the surcharge was not large relative to the 
normal errors that consumption equations make is good reason to expect 
a considerable standard error on the a* calculation. The estimates of 1.29 
and even 1.58 for a* are no surprise in this context. But negative numbers 
of the size of 6.85 and 3.62 for the auto sector are troublesome; they reflect 
the big errors in predicting autos and cannot be taken seriously. In any 
case, one cannot complain both about the substantial errors inherent in 
consumption forecasts and about the fact that a* estimates frequently lie 
outside the theoretical limits of zero and one. These are not two separate 
problems. 
General Discussion 
Robert Eisner extended his earlier comments, stressing that it was neces- 
sary to  consider the  nature of  any change in income  and its  effect on 
expected future income and assets before judging what consumption effect 
to expect. He contended that a permanent change in taxes might well have 
a larger and prompter impact than the models would imply. R. J. Gordon 
noted that the prediction errors of all consumption sectors combined in 
the surcharge  period came out favoring the no-effect view in the first four Arthur M.  Okun  211 
quarters  and the full-effect  view subsequently.  He argued  that monetary 
policy was disregarded  in the models and that easy money in the first 
quarters  following  the surcharge  could have explained  this error  pattern. 
Perry and Okun agreed that the monetary  influences  may have been 
important.  These factors  provide  the basis for an interesting  conjecture 
about what caused auto demand  to be so strong in the early quarters. 
Perry  pointed  out, however,  that there  was no special  error  pattern  to be 
explained  for nondurables  and services.  Okun noted that the Wharton 
model included  the money stock in its consumption  equations  and still 
gave answers  very  similar  to those from  the other  models. 
William  Fellner  and others  expressed  doubts  about  the reliability  of the 
results  because  of the persistent  errors  in the predictions,  particularly  in 
the auto equations.  Fellner  wondered  whether  the superiority  of the full- 
effect  view  over  the zero-effect  view  was sufficiently  great  to be convincing, 
even for nondurables  and services.  Okun agreed  that sophisticated  relia- 
bility tests would be useful,  but they were unobtainable  for this exercise. 
He did feel the errors  for nondurables  and services  on the full-effect  view 
were small enough and sufficiently  smaller  than those of the zero-effect 
view  to be intuitively  persuasive.  The full-effect  proponent  wins  the bet by 
a sizable  margin. 
William  Brainard  felt uncomfortable  that the exercise  allowed  the sur- 
charge  variable  to have the first crack at explaining  the errors.  Ideally, 
other variables  should have been given an equal opportunity  to explain 
them, including  a reestimation  of coefficients  on the original  variables  to 
allow for a possible  gradual  shift in structure. 
R. J. Gordon and William Branson  believed there might be offsets 
between  spending  on autos and on other  consumption  that would  call for 
more  emphasis  on the behavior  of aggregate  consumption.  Okun  pointed 
out that such offsetting  effects  as the models could identify  were allowed 
for in his computations;  but the models  themselves  found  that most of the 
unusual behavior  in auto purchases  during the estimation  period was 
offset by changes  in saving rather  than changes  in other consumption 
spending.  If much stronger  offsetting  effects  were suspected  in the pro- 
jection  period  of the surcharge,  they  should  have  shown  up in the quarterly 
error  patterns;  but they did not. Gordon, however,  felt that the offsets 
need not be simultaneous  in the way Okun suggested;  consumers  might 
hold down  their  nonauto  consumption  either  before  or after  buying  a car, 
in order  to help finance  the downpayment. 